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A.I.S.'s avatar

If he could step back to February last year, Putin would likely still intervene, just without the "initial soft touch" the Russian displayed.

An underappreciated aspect is that, according to the OSCE, Maidan-Ukraine massively escalated its shelling of Donbass, had amassed a rmy large enough to overpower the seperatist rebels, and was as a matter of fact going in.

Putins government would face existential threats if Maidan barbecues Donbass. As such, a counter invasion was essentially certain. The question was if Russia would focus on defending Donbass, or attempt to regime change Kiev.

As to the wars outcome.

Ukraine has essentially 4 possible "states". Pro Russian, Pro Western, Neutral and Ruined.

The Russian order of preference is:

1: Pro Russian, 2: Neutral, 3: Ruined, 4: Pro Western

The US order of preference is:

1: Pro western 2: Ruined 3: Pro Russian 4: Neutral

The EUs and Ukraines preference is:

1: Pro Western 2: neutral 3: Pro Russian 4: Rubble, but it also doesnt particularly matter.

A ruined Ukraine is the only "agreeable" outcome. For any other outcome, either Russia loses it "we can turn Ukraine into Rubble" veto, which is extremely unlikely, or the US changes its preferences, or the US loses its "we determine who rules in Kiev" veto.

Both changes in preferences of the USA (be it to internal politics or increased Chinese assertiveness or due to pressure elsewhere) or a loss of the USAs "we determine who rules in Kiev" power are things I assert as less unlikely then Russia losing its abilitiy to turn Ukraine into rubble.

The US prefering to focus on China, after Ukraine is rubbleized and thus less "worthwhile" to Russia is a possible situation. The US mishandling its pupeteering in Kiev to a level that their influence is sufficiently reduced is another such situation as well. The Ukrainians have committed enough warcrimes that western PR could throw them under the bus.

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Esteban's avatar

The Russian attack last February wasn’t meant to achieve a military victory (it wasn’t remotely big enough for that) but to get Ukraine to negotiate.

-Ukraine and Russia had agreed on the outlines of a deal to end the war, but Washington vetoed it.

- at the end of a war, but not during a war, territorial gains and losses are a good indicator of who won. During a war casualty counts and the ability to replace lost weaponry and logistics are. Attriting an enemy to the point of collapse without advancing or even while slowly retreating can be a winning strategy. Ukraine is not forthcoming with its casualty numbers but is conscripting women and 16 year olds to 60 year olds and sending some of them to the front after 3 weeks of training. (The US Army had a minimum of 52 weeks of training before sending soldiers into combat.) Ukraine is going around begging even for almost Museum vintage tanks. Russia isn’t doing any such thing. This should tell anyone with an open and fair mind how things are going.

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