More on What is Likely to Happen in Ukraine Next

In my last essay, I argued that the war between Russia and Ukraine was likely to turn into a stalemate because the Ukrainians had already picked most of the low-hanging fruit in terms of counteroffensives, the Russians had at least temporarily solved their manpower problem with mobilization and both sides were going to reduce the intensity of their operations due to a lack of ammunition for some critical weapon systems, although things were more worrisome for Ukraine especially in the long-run. But I did some more digging and it made me a bit more optimistic about Ukraine’s prospects. There are also recent developments that portend well for Ukraine, although I think many people exaggerate their significance. So I wanted to write a post-scriptum to that essay in which I will explain how my views have changed. I will keep this relatively short, at least by my standards, if only because I came down with a bad case of flu that took me down for most of last week and I’m still recovering. Given my tendency to write very long essays, maybe some of you will come to wish that I caught the flu more often. As always when I talk about military stuff, keep in mind that I’m no military expert and that I’m learning as I go to make sense of the war, so it’s entirely possible that some of the things I say are mistaken.

Both sides are going to face shortages of ammunition for artillery systems

First, I argued in my previous essay that while both sides were going to run out of ammunition for artillery, this was more true for Ukraine. I still think this is true, but the disparity between Russia and Ukraine may not be as large as I thought and may even shrink this year (although it’s hardly obvious and it probably won’t), so the situation is not as bad for Ukraine as I thought. Indeed, as some people pointed out to me, in that essay I ignored European production capacity of 155mm shells and focused exclusively on the US. I did so willingly because European allies of the US have a very small number of 155mm howitzers in their arsenals compared to the US and I assumed that a country’s production capacity was roughly proportional to how many such weapon systems it has, but it turns out that it’s completely wrong and in fact European countries as a whole produce significantly more 155mm shells than the US.

According to this article in The Wall Street Journal, which cites the owner of a Czech company that produces about 30% of the continent’s output of 155mm shells, Europe produces about 300,000 rounds each year. That’s just 2 months and a half of Ukraine’s current level of consumption even on conservative estimates, so this capacity is grossly inadequate, but the article points out that it’s currently being expanded. The owner of the Czech company cited in that article claims that it will already double output this year by producing 100,000 rounds. Presumably, he was already taking that expansion of production capacity at his company when he claimed that it produced 30% of Europe’s output, otherwise those claims are difficult to reconcile. That leaves about 200,000 rounds that must be produced by other companies. If we assume they will also double their output, which frankly strikes me as optimism bordering on the heroic, it means that European countries will produce about 500,000 rounds for 155mm howitzers next year. Meanwhile, as noted in my previous essay, the US will produce about 240,000.

However, as The Wall Street Journal article suggests, the expansion of production is meant just as much if not more to replenish or increase European inventories than to supply Ukraine. Indeed, not only did their inventories go down after European countries sent rounds to Ukraine last year to help it resist the Russian invasion, but the rate of consumption in that war has made NATO members realize their inventories needed to be much higher in case of a large-scale conflict. The same thing is true for the US, which had much larger inventories to begin with, but also sent vastly more shells to Ukraine. But again let’s be very optimistic and assume that NATO countries will send 75% of their production to Ukraine this year. To be clear, I don’t really believe it will be that high, but I’m trying to make a best case scenario given that in my last essay I was perhaps unduly pessimistic for Ukraine. Under this assumption, it means that Ukraine will have enough 155mm ammunition to fire approximately 1,500 rounds/day this year, which is not even 1/3 of what it actually consumes if we assume it fires 4,000 rounds/day on average.

This is based on optimistic assumptions though and I doubt NATO countries will be able to send as many 155mm they produced themselves. However, they may be able to do it by vacuuming stockpiles and production capacities in other countries, such as South Korea and Pakistan. Indeed, according to the Indian press, Pakistan will ship “159 containers of ammunition” to Ukraine, including 155mm shells. Islamabad was allied with the US during the Cold War, whereas Russia has traditionally been a major supplier of weapons to India, so it doesn’t have much to lose in helping Ukraine and on the contrary has a lot to gain by pleasing the US. The same thing can’t be said about South Korea though. As I noted in my previous essay, a deal for the US to purchase 100,000 rounds to South Korea and give them to Ukraine, thereby circumventing Seoul’s policy of not providing lethal assistance to either side, was also leaked in November but as far as I can tell it hasn’t happened yet and I doubt it will. After the story leaked, Seoul acknowledged it had been talking to the US about the sale of 155mm shells, but insisted that it wasn’t reneging on the aforementioned policy in response to criticism by Russia and that the US would have to be the end-user of the rounds. South Korea wants to keep good relations with Russia because it has influence over North Korea and could create serious problems by providing advanced weapons to North Korea.

There are probably still stockpiles of 152mm shells for Soviet howitzers lying around that can be procured from arms dealers or countries that have Russian weapon systems. Moreover, according to The Wall Street Journal article I already mentioned, Germany will also co-finance the refurbishment of a Soviet-era factory in Romania that will produce 152mm shells, but presumably it will take a while before it’s up and running. Since Ukraine still has a lot of Soviet-era artillery, this would save 155mm shells, which are designed for NATO howitzers. The problem is that most of the countries that have such ammunition are probably wary of pissing Russia off, because they rely on Russia to maintain their military equipment. Western countries would probably have to agree to sell them advanced weapon systems and in many cases they don’t want to, which is why they purchased them from Russia in the first place. As I noted in my previous essay, Ukraine has also launched the domestic production of 152mm shells, but so far production seems very low at 1,000-2,000 rounds/month. However, it seems that it has partnered with NATO countries to expand production of this kind of ammunition, but the volumes and timeline are unknown. Another problem with 152mm rounds is that, if Ukraine is going to keep using them, it must not only keep producing them but also the parts to maintain the Soviet artillery systems that fire them and that will further complicate the effort. Thus, even taking into account alternative sources of supply, I think Ukraine will face a serious shortage of shells this year.

Production in NATO members will also increase further over time, but it will take years and it still won’t be enough to cover Ukraine’s current level of consumption based on the plans for expansion that were announced. As noted in my previous essay, the US plans to increase production of 155mm rounds to 40,000/month by 2025, while the owner of the Czech company quoted by the Wall Street Journal also told Reuters that it would increase output to 150,000 rounds/year by then. If we assume other European producers will increase their output by the same proportion during that period, which again is optimistic, total NATO production of 155mm rounds should be around 1.2 million by then. That’s about 2,500 rounds/day on average if we assume that 75% will go to Ukraine, which still falls short of what Ukraine’s consumption so far. We should add the production of 152mm, but I doubt the volumes will be large enough to make a huge difference. Again, unless Western countries commit more resources to shell production in the future (beyond the plans that have already been announced), that’s based on relatively optimistic assumptions though.

However, Russia will also not be able to maintain its current level of consumption, which should make Ukraine’s shortage less critical. In my previous essay, I cited 2 estimates of Russia pre-war production of 152mm shells. Both inferred the number of shells produced from the revenue of the companies making them. I now think the lower estimate, according to which Russia was producing about 700,000 rounds/year in 2021, is more accurate, though many dubious assumptions had to be used for the calculation and it should still be considered very uncertain. On the other hand, the head of Estonian military intelligence estimated Russia pre-war production at 1.7 million shells/year, which he thinks could have doubled by now. He also thinks that Russia initially had a stockpile of 17 million shells and that it had only consumed 10 million of them at the beginning of December. However, I suspect that he might be exaggerating Russia’s production capacity, as it’s clear in the interview that he is anxious to stress that Russia has not ceased to be a threat to other countries besides Ukraine.

Still, as I noted in my previous essay, increasing the production of 152mm shells is probably less challenging for Russia than increasing the production of missiles and other precision-guided munitions, because dumb shells don’t require electronic components that have become harder to procure with sanctions. (I suspect the production of barrels, which need to be replaced every 2,000-3,000 rounds fired, will prove more challenging.) I think it’s reasonable to assume that Russia will be able to produce at least one million round/year for the rest of the war and it could be a lot more. If we use that number, it means that Russia would only have enough to fire about 2,700 rounds/day. If the report that North Korea has agreed to deliver millions of shells to Russia is true, it would partially solve this problem, but I have serious doubts about it. Russia probably still has stockpiles left and can probably find more in a few countries that use Soviet artillery systems, so my guess is that it will be able to sustain a higher consumption than that, but nevertheless there is no doubt that it will have to reduce it drastically. (CNN just published a story in which US officials claim that it’s already happening.) This is good news for Ukraine, even if it will be able to fire even less shells. On the other hand, I don’t really see how either side could successfully conduct large offensives against heavily fortified and well-defended areas with so little artillery, so this reinforces my conclusion that the war is going to turn into a stalemate.

Good news for Ukraine on air defense

Perhaps the best news for Ukraine I came across, although few people have pointed out how important this is, is the fact that Ukraine has apparently managed to tweak Buk systems to make them fire RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles, which are surface-to-air missiles used by several NATO countries and a few others. From what I gather, Buk systems are mainly used by Ukraine to provide air defense on the front, which is critical if it’s to prevent the Russians from being able to exploit their overwhelming advantage in air power. RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles are not as good as the missiles normally used with Buk systems, which in particular can strike targets at much higher altitudes, but presumably it’s better than nothing. It might allow Ukraine to use the air defense systems that Western countries are sending to defend their cities, without having to leave their frontlines completely exposed to Russian planes flying above the altitude at which MANPADS can hit them. I haven’t been able to find estimates of the number of RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles in Western stockpiles, but the author of the article linked to above claims “there should be plentiful stocks” across NATO.

A RIM-7 Sea Sparrow being launched from USS Abraham Lincoln

The supply of Western-made armored vehicles is a good news for Ukraine, but the impact is exaggerated

Another positive development for Ukraine is the fact that NATO countries have announced the delivery of Western-made armored vehicles they had so far refused to give to Ukraine. In my previous essay, I argued that Ukraine lacked offensive weapons to conduct large offensives against well-defended areas, so these vehicles will go some way toward alleviating that problem. However, I think the significance of this development has been somewhat exaggerated, since the numbers of vehicles sent are pretty underwhelming and remain way below what I argued Ukraine would need to conduct this kind of offensives. The US has announced that it would send 50 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Germany said that it would send 40 Schützenpanzer Marders. Prior to that, France had announced that it would send an undisclosed number of AMX-10 RC, a kind of light tanks. Germany said that training for the Marder would take place in Germany for 8 weeks and that it was aiming to deliver the vehicles to Ukraine by the end of March, so if we assume that it will be roughly the same for the Bradley and the AMX-10 RC, those vehicles should not be deployed on the battlefield until the end of winter or the beginning of spring.

A Bradley Fighting Vehicle during a training exercice. One can see the 25mm gun and the anti-tank missile system

The Bradley and the Marder are not main battle tanks but infantry fighting vehicles, which means they have less armor and a much smaller gun. As I explained in my previous essay, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief said he needed 600-700 of those to push back Russia to pre-invasion lines, but also 300 main battle tanks and 500 howitzers. The US latest military aid package also included 18 self-propelled 155mm howitzers and 100 armored personnel carriers, but at this pace it will be a while before Ukraine has what it needs, especially since the US will probably wants to make sure that Ukraine can use the Bradleys effectively before it sends more. (Some experts are skeptical that Ukraine can learn to use it effectively in just a few months, but the Ukrainians have surprised us before.) It still refuses to send main battle tanks, on the ground that Abrams are too difficult to operate and maintain, but the UK is apparently considering sending a few Challenger II tanks. However, we’re talking about as few as 10 of them, so again this wouldn't have a significant effect on the battlefield. Meanwhile, pressure continue to mount on Germany to authorize the delivery of Leopard 2 tanks, but it continues to refuse.

As I noted in my previous essay, US officials know they won’t be able to supply enough ammunition to Ukraine, so they’re trying to turn Ukraine’s military into a force that fights more like the US military and the latest aid package is explicitly designed to increase Ukraine’s maneuver capabilities. The US is aware that NATO can’t send enough 155mm shells to sustain Ukraine’s current level of consumption, so it wants to change the way in which the Ukrainian armed forces fight, so that it will operate more like the US military and rely less on artillery. However, as I noted previously, it’s very unclear that it can work without the air support that US ground troops can always rely on and it’s extremely unlikely that Western countries are going to donate hundreds of modern jet fighters to Ukraine and the means to suppress air defense, which is what it would need to gain air superiority against Russia. Moreover, based on what the US and its allies are sending at the moment, I don’t see how Ukraine will have the capability to conduct large offensives against heavily fortified areas with air defense and plenty of manpower anytime soon. It certainly won’t be the case this spring, so if as some reports claim the Ukrainians try to take Melitopol back then, I think it will probably go badly for them. The recent announcements by France, Germany and the US about the delivery of armored vehicles to Ukraine, which may soon be followed by a similar announcement by the UK about main battle tanks, are unlikely to make a huge difference on the battlefield and certainly won’t give Ukraine the ability to conduct this kind offensives right away.

They’re nevertheless important in that, once these kinds of weapons have been sent once and the Ukrainians have demonstrated they can use them effectively (assuming they do), more can be sent in the future. Still, according to a Russian opposition website (citing this analysis by a Russian military blogger on Telegram), Russia is capable of producing 200-250 new tanks and refurbishing about 600 a year. Thus, even assuming that Western tanks and more generally weapon systems are far superior to what Russia can produce (which I’m sure is true in most cases), it will be a while before Western deliveries can give Ukraine the kind of advantage in offensive weapons I’m assuming it needs to successfully conduct large offensives against well-defended areas and I don’t understand why several military experts think it will be over this year. This is particularly true when you consider that, as I noted in my previous essay, Russia only spends about 7.5% of its GDP on military expenditure and therefore still has a lot of room to commit more resources to the war. Moreover, although so far Western support has been significant and Western countries keep sending new types of weapons to Ukraine, it’s hardly obvious that it will ever reach the point that would allow Ukraine to win decisively.

The political logic of Western support and what it means for Ukraine and Russia

I think Biden and Sullivan would rather not support Ukraine indefinitely, but they’re in a difficult situation, which means they may have to. They correctly regard Russia as a relatively minor power that can’t threaten the US hegemony and are much more interested in the contest with China, so they don’t want Ukraine to monopolize resources for years and hope to be able to reallocate them to Asia as soon as possible (people like to say that US military aid to Ukraine is only a relatively small share of the US defense budget, but they don’t seem to realize that procurement is only a small share of that budget and the truth is that Ukraine has become a major drain on the US military industry), but this isn’t possible without a deal and it can’t be a deal that Russia can present as a victory because some US allies in Europe would not accept it and it would be bad for the US credibility now that it has committed yourself to Ukraine’s defense. Initially, the US thought that Ukraine would lose quickly and the plan was to support an insurgency, which wouldn’t have drained US resources in the way the current war does.

US National Security Advisor in Kiev during his visit last November

The fact that, as I noted in my previous essay, Sullivan started to nudge Zelensky towards giving up the goal of recovering Crimea while he was in Kiev last November is evidence for that interpretation, which is also consistent with Sullivan’s long-time focus on the competition with China. The problem for Biden and Sullivan is that clearly not everyone inside the administration, to say nothing of people outside of it, share this view. Some people think the US should help Ukraine to win a decisive victory. A good example was recently offered by this op-ed penned by Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates, where they argue that Ukraine can’t win unless the US provides Ukraine “with a dramatic increase in military supplies and capability”, then conclude that it should do it. (The fact that Sullivan’s conversation with Zelensky in November leaked is also evidence that some people in the administration disagree with that policy.) For Biden and Sullivan, the risk with that policy is that it would lead Russia to massively increase the resources it commits to the war, which in turn would likely prolong the US involvement in Ukraine and delay the moment when it can go back to dealing with the rise of China.

On the other hand, for the reasons I explained above, they can’t just stop altogether supporting Ukraine either, so they’re trying to strike a middle course by escalating slowly in the hope that it will eventually put Ukraine in a position where it can negotiate a settlement without turning the conflict into a total war, as would almost certainly happen if Ukraine made a serious attempt to take back Crimea. As long as Ukraine keeps making gains, they also can’t pressure Kiev into negotiating. However, if eventually the war turns into a prolonged stalemate this will probably happen, so it’s very important for Ukraine to keep making territorial gains and not to suffer a big defeat. Thus, if I’m right that it won’t have the resources to conduct a large offensive against a well-defended place such as Melitopol this year, it should pursue less ambitious objectives that would not give the impression that it’s not making progress anymore and that it will just be more of the same forever. This will keep the flow of Western support going by making it harder politically to stop it, thereby keeping alive the possibility that it will eventually reach a level at which a decisive victory over Russia would be possible.

If I were Putin, on the other hand, I would launch a new round of mobilization (as the head of Ukrainian military intelligence claims it’s about to do) as soon as possible and correspondingly increase the amount of resources allocated to the war, but I would not deploy the new conscripts to Ukraine until the end of the year and would spend this time training and equipping them as well as possible. Meanwhile, I would use the people who have already been mobilized to play defense, thus causing Ukraine to lose manpower and equipment by launching offensives against Russian positions. This would send a signal to the West that sending more aid to Ukraine will always result in escalation on Russia’s part, which in turn would deter more support by strengthening the hand of people in the US administration and elsewhere who make that argument. If by the end of the year Ukraine were still not willing to negotiate, Russia would have enough trained manpower and equipment to launch another offensive with reasonable chances of success, especially since in that hypothesis the Ukrainian armed forces would have lost a lot of manpower and equipment and their morale would be low. Of course, this would only have a chance to work if Moscow revised downward its territorial goals, but I think its current territorial goals make no sense anyway so it will have to do so eventually. Playing defense by waiting for the Ukrainians to come for almost a year probably wouldn’t be great for morale, but it would beat getting their asses kicked repeatedly and this strategy at least has a chance of giving Russia a way out that can be presented as a victory.