A Conversation With Marc Trachtenberg About the Debate on the No-NATO-Expansion Pledge
Earlier this year, I published a detailed essay on the debate about whether the West had promised not to expand NATO to Central and Eastern Europe during the negotiations on Germany’s reunification at the end of the Cold War, a pledge that was subsequently violated according to the Russians.1 This essay is a first part of the series on my interpretation of the origins of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and in particular on the role played by NATO expansion, which I think can’t be understood without going back to the end of the Cold War. The no-NATO-expansion pledge debate has focused on statements made by Western officials and in particular Secretary of State James Baker during preliminary talks held in Moscow on the issue in February 1990. While everybody agrees that on that occasion US and West German officials pledged not to expand NATO to the east if Germany was allowed to stay in the Alliance after reunification, people disagree about what they meant and what implications those exchanges had. Critics of the Russian position argue that Western officials were only talking about the territory of the GDR, that Gorbachev did not take even this limited no-expansion deal and that it was subsequently retracted anyway.
In my essay, I argued that while critics of the Russian position are probably right that Baker’s statement in Moscow was about the territory of the GDR and not Central and Eastern Europe as a whole, this more limited assurance nevertheless had implications for NATO expansion to the rest of the region that not only were not voided by subsequent developments in the negotiations on Germany’s reunification, but that in fact were even strengthened by the fact that, in the months that followed, Western officials made a series of more vague but also broader assurances that clearly implied that NATO would not be expanded to Central and Eastern Europe against Moscow’s wishes and more generally that Russia would be included in the post-Cold War European security architecture. I therefore concluded that, despite what most people in the West claim today, the Russians have a good case that NATO expansion violated assurances made at the time, even if that it is not the one people typically make.
One of the people who have defended the Russian view in a more traditional way, by focusing on the statements made by Western officials during the preliminary talks in Moscow, is Marc Trachtenberg. A professor of history at UCLA, Prof. Trachtenberg is one of the best historians of the Cold War and particularly of the European security order that emerged from it after WWII, on which he has written extensively. In particular, he wrote a very influential paper on the debate about the no-NATO-expansion pledge, which had a significant influence on my own thinking about the topic. However, in my essay, I argue that while I’m in broad agreement with him on the more general debate, he is wrong to think that Baker was talking about Central and Eastern Europe in general and not just the GDR when he made his infamous assurance to Gorbachev. After I published my essay, I sent it to Prof. Trachtenberg, who promptly replied with extensive comments.2 Unsurprisingly, he takes issue with my argument that when he promised that if the Soviet Union agreed to let Germany stay in NATO it wouldn’t expand “one inch to the east” Baker was probably only talking about the territory of the GDR, arguing that the evidence I adduced in favor of that view can be explained in a way that is consistent with his claim that Baker was talking about Central and Eastern Europe as a whole.
As I explained to him in the course of our conversation, I acknowledge that his alternative interpretation is not crazy and that he may be right, but on the whole I still think that mine is more likely to be correct. Nevertheless, I admit that his argument weakens my case on this point and that I should therefore have stated it more carefully, but to the extent that it does weaken my case on this specific point, it strengthens the more general case I make for the view that Russia has a case when it complains that the West violated assurances made at the end of the Cold War, on which both Prof. Trachtenberg and I agree. I thought the exchange would be of interest to other people, especially if they have read both Prof. Trachtenberg’s paper and my essay on the topic, so I asked him if he would let me publish it here and he kindly agreed. I reproduce the exchange below, only slightly edited to fix typos and remove irrelevant passages, mostly where I’m apologizing for having taken so long to reply to his initial comments because I’m literally the worst person at replying to emails or messages in general.
Marc Trachtenberg to Philippe Lemoine
Dear Philippe,
I very much enjoyed reading the paper you sent to me. I certainly learned a lot from it. Some of your arguments are quite new, and one argument, in particular, struck me as very important. This, you probably won’t be surprised to learn, is the argument you make about why the non-expansion assurances given in February 1990 (except for the ones Genscher had given) related just to eastern Germany, and not to eastern Europe as a whole.
That’s what I want to focus on here, and let me begin with a small comment about how you present your conclusion on this issue. At a number of points in the paper you give the impression that you think you were able to show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the assurances (except for Genscher’s) related just to eastern Germany. You state flatly, for example, that “critics of the Russian position are right that US and West German officials were only talking about the GDR (with one important exception about which they misrepresent the evidence).” But at times your bottom line is much more nuanced. “The truth,” you write at one point, “is that, just based on what was said during that conversation according to the State Department memorandum that I have been quoting, it's impossible to tell for sure what Baker meant, but I think it’s more likely than not that he was only talking about the GDR.” (emphasis added) And at another point you write: "Some people on both sides of the debate argue that context definitely shows either that Western officials were only talking about the territory of the GDR or that on the contrary they were talking about Central and Eastern Europe in general, but I think that if we are honest we have to acknowledge that, except for Genscher, it's simply impossible to tell for sure what they meant." (emphasis added) I think that latter, more nuanced claim is far more defensible.
But let me focus on the substantive issue here. Your contention that the February 9 assurances related to eastern Germany, and the argument you make to support that claim is actually very nice. It is certainly one I haven’t heard before.
You develop that argument in section 1.1.2 (“What US and West German officials told their Soviet counterparts in Moscow”). You first quote Baker telling Shevardnadze that if the united Germany remained in NATO, “there would, of course, have to be iron clad guarantees that NATO's jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward” and that the inclusion of the united Germany in NATO “would have to be done in a manner that would satisfy Germany's neighbors to the east.” And then you comment:
This is ambiguous as to whether he just meant the territory of the GDR or Central and Eastern Europe in general, but the reference to the concerns of “Germany’s neighbors to the east” suggests he was just talking about the GDR. Indeed, if he had been referring to a possible expansion to Central and Eastern European countries, it’s hard to see why those countries would have been concerned about it, whereas it makes perfect sense if he was talking about NATO forces moving into the territory of the GDR, since in that case Czechoslovakia would have to deal with NATO’s presence not just on its western border but also on its northern one and NATO would suddenly appear on Poland’s western border. Although the Warsaw Pact was falling apart, nobody thought it would completely disappear so rapidly, so it made sense to worry about the reactions of those countries.
And you go on to quote the assurance Baker gave to Gorbachev himself later that day: “We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.” Your comment includes the following observations:
Again, the phrase Baker used when he said that NATO would not expand is quite general, which if not for the context would be more naturally interpreted as referring to Central and Eastern Europe in general and not just the GDR. However, the fact that Baker said that immediately after saying that he understood that “countries in the east” would need assurances once again suggests that he was talking about the GDR. Indeed, if he was talking about the expansion of NATO to Central and Eastern European countries, then how would ruling out that possibility assuage the security concerns of those same countries? Trachtenberg interprets this passage as evidence that Baker’s assurance was about Central and Eastern Europe in general and not just the territory of the GDR, but that doesn’t make sense since he talked about “countries” in the plural and therefore couldn’t have been referring only to the Soviet Union.
Now, as I say, this struck me as a new and important argument. But I’m sure you won’t be surprised when I tell I wasn’t totally convinced. There are, to my mind, basically two problems with it. The first is that you assume that when Baker referred to “Germany’s neighbors to the east” and to “the countries in the East” he had the entire Warsaw Pact in mind—that he was thinking of Poland, Hungary, and the other eastern European states, as well as Russia. And, indeed, if that were the case, it is hard to see how ruling out an expansion of NATO into eastern Europe should “assuage the security concerns” of the East Europeans. But I think that when Baker referred to “Germany’s neighbors to the east,” and even to the “countries in the East,” he was really referring just to Russia. He was trying to be diplomatic and did not want to rub the Russians’ noses in the fact that their bloc was disintegrating, so he used language that made it seem he might be referring to the Warsaw Pact as a whole. But I doubt whether anyone was really taken in.
Of course, that in itself doesn’t prove your interpretation is wrong. It simply shows that it is possible that Baker did not really have Poland and the other east European states in mind. But my second point, to my mind at least, is more compelling. For let’s say you’re right, and that Baker was referring to the east European countries when he was talking about how NATO not expanding into eastern Germany could assuage the security concerns of the “countries in the East.” You’d then have to explain why Poland and the other new democracies in “eastern and central Europe” should be more concerned about the whole of Germany being included in NATO than if part of the reunified German state was excluded from the western alliance—that is, you’d have to explain why a non-expansion assurance limited to eastern Germany should assuage their concerns. But you don’t do this, and in fact I don’t think it can be done. It would be much more to the interest of Poland, for example, if all of Germany were in NATO than if the united Germany’s integration into NATO was limited in any way: a more independent Germany, after all, would be freer, in the future, to challenge her eastern borders. And if Poland and the others were looking to build ties of their own with NATO (and, in fact, they had already begun to move in that direction at this point, as Baker well knew—as you point out, it was even in the newspapers), they should have welcomed the inclusion of all of Germany in NATO, because it would bring the western alliance closer to their own borders.
Or, to give your own example (in the first bloc quote above), do you really think the new democratic government in Czechoslovakia would have been more concerned about NATO moving into eastern Germany than if the new German state was half-in, half-out—that is, if only German troops were in that area? I can’t see why. So it just doesn’t make sense to me to take Baker’s references to “Germany’s neighbors to the east” as referring to the east Europeans, since they would not be harmed either by a NATO expansion into eastern Europe (as you say) or by an expansion limited to eastern Germany.
So, although I thought the argument you made was interesting and intelligent, I just didn’t buy it. I think Baker’s reference to the interests of the countries in the east was just a nice way of alluding to Russia’s interests, and to Russia’s concern about how the balance of power would shift against her if all of Germany was allowed to remain in NATO. I think what Baker was trying to do here was essentially to make it clear to the Russians that that shift would not go too far, and that, in particular, NATO would not expand at all. This was an assurance, given purely unilaterally, and not part of a “deal”; the goal was to make it easier for Gorbachev to agree to the inclusion of all of Germany in NATO. And, as even Spohr admits, it certainly had that effect—and the fact that it did was one of the main reasons why a kind of obligation to note expand NATO into eastern Europe had come into being.
Thanks again for sharing your paper with me.
Best regards,
Marc
Philippe Lemoine to Marc Trachtenberg
Dear Marc,
…
Thanks a lot for your thoughtful comments on my essay, they have given me a lot to think about. There are some points on which I think you are right, but overall I wasn't totally convinced. Let me address the different points you make in turn.
I'll start with your observation that I'm not always consistent in how I characterize my conclusion on the February preliminary talks in Moscow:
That’s what I want to focus on here, and let me begin with a small comment about how you present your conclusion on this issue. At a number of points in the paper you give the impression that you think you were able to show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the assurances (except for Genscher’s) related just to eastern Germany. You state flatly, for example, that “critics of the Russian position are right that US and West German officials were only talking about the GDR (with one important exception about which they misrepresent the evidence).” But at times your bottom line is much more nuanced. “The truth,” you write at one point, “is that, just based on what was said during that conversation according to the State Department memorandum that I have been quoting, it's impossible to tell for sure what Baker meant, but I think it’s more likely than not that he was only talking about the GDR.” (emphasis added) And at another point you write: "Some people on both sides of the debate argue that context definitely shows either that Western officials were only talking about the territory of the GDR or that on the contrary they were talking about Central and Eastern Europe in general, but I think that if we are honest we have to acknowledge that, except for Genscher, it's simply impossible to tell for sure what they meant." (emphasis added) I think that latter, more nuanced claim is far more defensible.
On this point, I think you are simply right. The inconsistencies in how I present my conclusion you point out are really a reflection of the fact that, as I was writing this paper, I kept going back and forth on exactly how strong a claim I could make based on the available evidence. These inconsistencies are essentially traces of my thinking process during my work on this paper, as I was deciding exactly what I believed, which should have been eliminated in the essay but were not, probably because even by the time I was done writing the paper my thinking on this issue remained somewhat in flux. Upon reflection, in part because of one of the arguments you made (which I discuss below), I think my actual conclusion is closer to the weaker phrasing I sometimes use in the essay: although it's impossible to know for sure what Western officials and in particular Baker meant, it's more likely than not that they were only talking about the GDR.
Now let me discuss your comments on the main argument I make in favor of that conclusion. You raise two objections against it. Here is the first:
The first is that you assume that when Baker referred to “Germany’s neighbors to the east” and to “the countries in the East” he had the entire Warsaw Pact in mind—that he was thinking of Poland, Hungary, and the other eastern European states, as well as Russia. And, indeed, if that were the case, it is hard to see how ruling out an expansion of NATO into eastern Europe should “assuage the security concerns” of the East Europeans. But I think that when Baker referred to “Germany’s neighbors to the east,” and even to the “countries in the East,” he was really referring just to Russia. He was trying to be diplomatic and did not want to rub the Russians’ noses in the fact that their bloc was disintegrating, so he used language that made it seem he might be referring to the Warsaw Pact as a whole. But I doubt whether anyone was really taken in.
I admit that the possibility you mention here about how to interpret Baker had not occurred to me and that I don't think there is anything in the evidentiary record that would allow me to rule it out categorically, but I'm nevertheless not convinced and, while I agree that he might have been talking in the plural merely to be diplomatic and spare Soviet sensitivities, I think it's more likely that he was really talking about the fact that NATO expansion to the GDR might be seen as a threat not just by the Soviet Union but also by at least some of the Warsaw Pact states. Ultimately, I don't think this issue can be settled univocally by the evidence and I think reasonable people who are familiar with the evidence can disagree about it, but when I read the internal communications within the Bush administration at the time, the records of conversation with foreign officials, etc. I don't see any compelling reason to think that this is what Baker was doing. Still, since I have to admit that it's not an unreasonable interpretation and that I can't rule it out, your argument at least convinced me that I should state my conclusion in the weaker way I presented above.
This brings me to your second point, which on the other hand I find much less convincing, even if you apparently think it's more compelling:
Of course, that in itself doesn’t prove your interpretation is wrong. It simply shows that it is possible that Baker did not really have Poland and the other east European states in mind. But my second point, to my mind at least, is more compelling. For let’s say you’re right, and that Baker was referring to the east European countries when he was talking about how NATO not expanding into eastern Germany could assuage the security concerns of the “countries in the East.” You’d then have to explain why Poland and the other new democracies in “eastern and central Europe” should be more concerned about the whole of Germany being included in NATO than if part of the reunified German state was excluded from the western alliance—that is, you’d have to explain why a non-expansion assurance limited to eastern Germany should assuage their concerns. But you don’t do this, and in fact I don’t think it can be done. It would be much more to the interest of Poland, for example, if all of Germany were in NATO than if the united Germany’s integration into NATO was limited in any way: a more independent Germany, after all, would be freer, in the future, to challenge her eastern borders. And if Poland and the others were looking to build ties of their own with NATO (and, in fact, they had already begun to move in that direction at this point, as Baker well knew—as you point out, it was even in the newspapers), they should have welcomed the inclusion of all of Germany in NATO, because it would bring the western alliance closer to their own borders.
Or, to give your own example (in the first bloc quote above), do you really think the new democratic government in Czechoslovakia would have been more concerned about NATO moving into eastern Germany than if the new German state was half-in, half-out—that is, if only German troops were in that area? I can’t see why. So it just doesn’t make sense to me to take Baker’s references to “Germany’s neighbors to the east” as referring to the east Europeans, since they would not be harmed either by a NATO expansion into eastern Europe (as you say) or by an expansion limited to eastern Germany.
As I see it, you make two distinct though related arguments here, so let me address them in turn.
Your first argument is that not only would the new, democratic governments in the Warsaw Pact countries have no reason to fear more a Germany wholly integrated in NATO, but on the contrary they would have every reason to prefer that.
According to you, a more independent Germany would be freer, in the future, to challenge their borders. This implicitly assumes that, had Germany been only partly in NATO after reunification (the territory of the GDR being somehow excluded from NATO's "jurisdiction" as Baker put it in Moscow), it would be more independent, but I don't think that assumption is very plausible. As I note in my essay, it's really unclear what Baker's formula (which I think was the somewhat incoherent result of taking Genscher's more ambitious formula and watering down without giving much thought about whether the resulting formula was practical, a point that was raised by people in the NSC at the time when they criticized Baker's formula) would have amounted to in practice, but it's hard to think of any implementation on which Germany would be more like to challenge its eastern borders against the will of the rest of NATO. I suppose one could argue that, if German forces in the territory of the GDR were not under NATO command, Germany would be freer to use them against its neighbors, but I think that assumption is false. First, even in the FRG during the Cold War, not all West German land forces were integrated directly within NATO structures. Thus, if having forces outside of those structures is what would have given Germany a freer hand to seek a revision of its eastern borders, then it wouldn't have changed anything if Germany had been wholly rather than partly in NATO because even in the former case it would presumably have had forces not directly under NATO command. It seems to me that, no matter how Baker's formula of a Germany half-in/half-out would have been implemented in practice (assuming there was even a way to translate that formula into a concrete system, which I find hardly obvious), the key fact is that it would have been part of NATO and thus under the political influence of the other members and in particular of the US.
Your argument that Germany's full inclusion in NATO would also have made it easier for Central and Eastern European countries to build ties with NATO also isn't very convincing to me. First, while it's true that at the time some of them had already started to think about such ties, I think everything was still very much in flux, nobody had any idea what this would entail or even if it would happen and therefore I don't think it would have been crazy at all for Baker to assume that at least some of those countries might be worried if NATO moved closer toward their borders. Moreover, no matter exactly how Baker's formula would have been implemented exactly, it's not clear how it would have made such ties, which at the time were seen as primarily political to the extent that people were thinking about them at all, would have been much facilitated by Germany's full integration in NATO or conversely precluded by the exclusion of Eastern Germany from NATO's "jurisdiction", whatever exactly this could have meant. I'm not saying that one couldn't make an argument to that effect, but again to me the central point here is that Baker's formula was very impressionistic and what it would have amounted to in practice was very unclear, so I don't think it would have been particularly surprising if he'd seen it as somewhat less threatening to Warsaw Pact states, if only because if at least at the rhetorical level it seemed to imply less change to the status quo.
Your second argument is that, even if Central and Eastern European states had no reason to fear more a Germany only partly in NATO (as I have just argued), they nevertheless had no reason to fear it less. This argument, it seems to me, is implicitly premised on (some of) the same mistaken assumptions people make when they argue that Russia has no reason to see NATO expansion as a security threat. I can think of several reasons why Central and Eastern European countries might have preferred a reunified Germany in NATO, but with the territory of the GDR somehow excluded.
Whatever this partial exclusion could have meant, and again I think it was very unclear because I think Baker came up with this formula by watering down Genscher's more ambitious formula which he felt conceded too much to the Soviets, it would at least have precluded the presence of foreign NATO troops in that territory and this would likely have meant less troops overall in that territory. In turn, this would have been less threatening to Germany's eastern neighbors, for several reasons. First, it would have decreased the probability of some accidental border incident, which could have resulted in an unintended conflict. After all, at the same time as those discussions on Germany's reunification were taking place, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were negotiating conventional arms reduction precisely because this was thought to reduce the probability of a conflict, so more generally the idea that reducing troop levels in Eastern Germany would have been conducive to greater security for Germany's eastern neighbors is hardly outlandish.
Moreover, if NATO had more troops closer to Warsaw Pact borders, it would make it better able to use the (if only implicit) threat of military force on its eastern flank to secure political concessions in international negotiations. (I think that, to the extent that Russia's opposition to NATO expansion is explained by the fact that it perceives it as a security threat and not for broader political reasons, that's largely because Russian political and military elites see the apparition of NATO military infrastructure on its borders as weakening its position in international negotiations for this kind of reasons and less because they see it as an impediment to their own reliance on implicit military threat to impose their will on their neighbors, as most people think.) To be clear, I think political and military leaders generally overestimate how much such things matter, but they do think they matter and therefore I don't think the idea that Baker would have assumed that Germany's eastern neighbors might see his formula as less threatening than full integration of Germany in NATO post-reunification as nonsensical.
Finally, I would like to point that, in the end, restriction NATO's freedom of movement in the territory of the GDR was the option that was chosen to assuage the Soviet Union's concerns over German continued NATO membership after reunification and, while it was clearly less than the Soviets would have liked, they nevertheless clearly saw that as better than nothing and some kind of guarantee. But if this was true of the Soviet Union, then why couldn't it have been true also of at least some Central and Eastern European countries, in a scenario where they continued to see NATO as a threat? Again, I agree that many had already started to move toward NATO, but as I noted above at the beginning of February nobody including them had a clear view of what the European security landscape would look like by the time the dust created by the revolutions of 1989 had settled.
In conclusion, I would like to make a more general observation, which is that while I'm not fully convinced by your argument and still think the weak version of my conclusion on the specific issue of what Baker and other Western officials meant during the preliminary talks in February 1990 is correct, if in fact you were right it would not only be a problem for my broader argument in the essay but on the contrary would only strengthen it. Indeed, my overall conclusion is that no matter how one interprets Baker's statements February 1990 statements, those statements were part of a broader series of vague but nevertheless meaningful assurances that Western officials made to their Soviet counterpart between 1989 and 1991, which gave them every reason to expect that Moscow would somehow be included in the post-Cold War European security order and to see the subsequent decision to expand NATO against their wishes as a betrayal. In fact, precisely because I think that is true, I think the debate about what Baker meant exactly during the February 1990 talks does not matter as much as people on both sides of the broader no-NATO-expansion pledge debate seem to think. I suspect you don't disagree with that view, but I would be curious to know for sure.
Best,
Philippe
Marc Trachtenberg to Philippe Lemoine
Dear Philippe,
Thanks again for your email, which I very much enjoyed reading. Let me make just a few quick comments in response. First, I just don't think the Poles, the Czechs, or the Hungarians, in February 1990, thought the inclusion of eastern Germany in the NATO area was the least bit threatening, or that Baker or any other U.S. policymaker thought that they were worried about what it would mean for them and felt it was important to assure them that NATO's jurisdiction would not extent into eastern Germany. If anything, I would expect the East Europeans to welcome eastern Germany's full integration into NATO. The reason, to my mind, would have to do, say, 90% with Russia and only 10% with Germany. Their fear was that Gorbachev would be overthrown and a resurgent USSR would once again try to draw them into her sphere of influence. That would lead them to welcome NATO expansion; including eastern Germany in NATO would be seen as a step toward their own inclusion in the western alliance. Germany was a minor, but not negligible, factor. Half-in, half-out was not particularly troubling in itself, but it might have come across as a way station on the road to a more fully independent, unified German state. But, again, I don't think this was a major factor. So let's say it didn't make a different one way or the other. But if that was the case, how could a promise not to extend NATO's jurisdiction into eastern Europe provide them with any reassurance? Against what? Unlike you, I just don't see how including eastern Germany in NATO would threaten them in any way.
The archival evidence, I think, should shed some light on all these issues. It might show, in particular, that I'm wrong about what Baker et al. thought the east Europeans were worried about.
Finally, you raised the issue at the end of your email about how important the particular issue of the February 1990 assurances is. The more general assurances, I agree, mattered a great deal. But the specific assurances Baker gave did matter a lot, and the proof is that the Russians refer to them over and over again. And I personally feel it is totally understandable for them to do so. You can't just make promises and then walk away from them and expect there to be no consequences.
Best regards,
Marc
Philippe Lemoine to Marc Trachtenberg
Dear Marc,
Thanks for your reply. Let me quickly address some of the points you make in it.
On the first point, I wouldn't be surprised if some Central and Eastern European leaders had already been thinking along the lines you sketch here at the beginning of February 1990, but I think you are looking at this with the benefit of hindsight and underestimating how open and foggy the future looked to both Central and Eastern European and US officials at the time.
Again, while it's true that many people were already talking about the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact by the end of January, it was still very unclear what new European security order would emerge from this upheaval and government officials had different ideas on the topic. Moreover, everything was moving very quickly, so it's very difficult to be confident about what different government officials thought at the time. Indeed, we have plenty of evidence that government officials disagreed on how to approach those changes and changed their mind about it quickly during that period not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in the Soviet Union and in the West, so this very general point shouldn't even be controversial and the only real question is what views different officials in each country held at different points during this period.
On this issue, as a cable sent by the US embassy in Vienna to the Secretary of State on February 1 shows, during a session of an OSCE high-level military doctrine seminar that took place on January 30 (just 10 days before Baker met Gorbachev in Moscow), WTO officials from both Poland and Czechoslovakia told their NATO counterparts that they saw large military exercises in Europe as threatening, so I don't think it's implausible at all that Baker might have thought that it would assuage some of their concerns to give them an assurance that even if Germany stayed in NATO after reunification the territory of the GDR would somehow be excluded and NATO troops would not move closer to their borders.
It's true that, as I note in my essay, some Central and Eastern European officials expressed their interest about developing closer ties with NATO to a US delegation headed by Eagleburger in February, but the precise nature of those ties was still very unclear at the time (so it doesn't necessarily mean they would have welcomed the arrival of NATO military infrastructure closer to their borders), it happened 2 weeks later and again not only was people's thinking changing very rapidly during this period but different people also had different concerns. Again, I don't think any of that shows that Baker's use of the plural in his conversation with Gorbachev could only have been a way to spare Soviet sensitivities, though I also don't deny that it's a possibility.
On the archival evidence, I agree that in principle it could definitely prove that you are right or wrong about what Baker was thinking at the time, I just meant that as far as I know none of the available evidence did either.
As for the last point you make, of course I agree with you that it matters if the West violated a more specific promise made by Baker in February, but my point is that I think it’s unclear whether it did because it’s unclear that Baker promised what the Russians alleged. When I say that it doesn’t matter as much as people have claimed, I don’t mean to deny that it would matter a great deal if Baker indeed had made that promise, but that even if he didn’t intend to make such a promise the West nevertheless made broader assurances that it subsequently violated and in that case I don’t think there is any such uncertainty.
To be clear, when the Russians subsequently claimed to interpret Baker's February 1990 assurance as applying to Central and Eastern Europe in general and not just to the GDR, I have no doubt they were being sincere and my point is not to deny that. But the Russian officials who made this accusation against the West, referring explicitly to Baker's assurance, were not directly involved in the February 1990 discussions and I think it wouldn't be surprising if they had mistakenly but sincerely misinterpreted it in retrospect. (On this point, as I note in my essay, note that Gorbachev, who was directly involved in those discussions, made a more nuanced claim very close to my own argument.) In fact, as I point out in my essay, Falin sent a note to Gorbachev in April 1990 in which he described the February assurances as a willingness to commit to “the non-expansion of NATO's sphere of activity to the GDR [emphasis is mine]”. To my knowledge, nobody had noticed that before, but in my opinion this is evidence that, whatever Baker intended at the time, Soviet officials understood his assurances as applying narrowly to the GDR and not to Central and Eastern Europe as a whole.
Best,
Philippe
March Trachtenberg to Philippe Lemoine
Thanks again for your email. It will be interesting to see what the evidence reveals about these matters. I personally just find it hard to believe that the Poles or Czechs should have been more worried about American troops moving into eastern Germany than about German troops moving in there, or that anyone should have thought they would be. But let's see what the documents show.
Philippe Lemoine to Marc Trachtenberg
Dear Marc,
I have already filed a FOIA request to obtain documents about the Two Plus Four process that are cited in various memoirs and other books, but they pertain to the last stretch of the negotiations and in particular to the US last minute insistence on the added minute to the treaty to allow the passage of foreign troops in the territory of the GDR (as well as others for documents relevant to the debate about NATO expansion in the Clinton administration), which unfortunately the State Department has been very slow to address and has so far only done in a very unsatisfactory manner.
But this exchange has convinced me that I should file another request asking for documents on Baker's meeting with Genscher at the beginning of February 1990 and memoranda prepared for him ahead of his visit to Moscow a week later. I don't think anyone has obtained those documents so far and you are right that they could shed light on this debate about what Baker had in mind when he made his infamous assurance to Gorbachev and perhaps even conclusively settle it depending on what the archival evidence contains.
…
Best,
Philippe
I plan to edit down my original essay to make it shorter eventually and hopefully I will also have obtained some of the documents I mention in my last email by then, in which case I’ll also revise my position on the point I debated with Prof. Trachtenberg if they shed light on the issue, but I want to finish the rest of the series on the origins of the Russo-Ukrainian War it’s part of first. The other essays in the series will also be published on CSPI first, so if you’re interested, you should subscribe to the organization’s newsletter.
The essay is very long and is almost a book-length treatment of the issue, with over 200 footnotes, but I was asked to write a short article summarizing it for Russia.Post (a magazine edited by The Russia Program at the George Washington University), so you can also read that if you don’t have time for the full version.
I would like to thank Prof. Trachtenberg again here for not only taking the time to read my essay in the first place, but also for sending me extensive and thoughtful comments on it. As I explained to him in our exchange, while I was ultimately not convinced, I admit that he may be right.